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Abstract. We study the properties of Braess’s paradox in the context of the model of congestion
games with flow over time introduced by Koch and Skutella. We compare them to the well known
properties of Braess’s paradox for Wardrop’s model of games with static flows. We show that
there are networks which do not admit Braess’s paradox in Wardrop’s model, but which admit
it in the model with flow over time. Moreover, there is a topology that admits a much more
severe Braess’s ratio for this model. Further, despite its symmetry for games with static flow,
we show that Braess’s paradox is not symmetric for flows over time. We illustrate that there
are network topologies which exhibit Braess’s paradox, but for which the transpose does not.
Finally, we conjecture a necessary and sufficient condition of existence of Braess’s paradox in
a network, and prove the condition of existence of the paradox either in the network or in its
transpose.
Keywords: Flows over time, Braess’s paradox, Dynamic flows, Selfish routing, Congestion
games.
1 Introduction
Selfish routing and congestion games on networks have been analyzed mainly with respect to
only static flows. The most prevalent model of congestion games with static flows is Wardrop’s
model [7, 18] extensively studied by Roughgarden and Tardos [15, 16]. A game in Wardrop’s
model is played by an infinite set of players each of which is selfishly routing only a negligible
amount of his traffic.
In various applications, e.g. road traffic control and communication networks, however,
flow variation over time is a crucial feature. Flow congestion on links and the time to traverse
them may change over time in such applications and the flow does not reach its destination
instantaneously, but it travels through the network at a certain speed determined by link
transit times. We model these phenomena by flows over time (also known as dynamic flows)
introduced by Ford and Fulkerson [5, 6].
Nash equilibria for flows over time were introduced by Vickrey [17] and Yagar [19] and
mainly studied within the traffic community. For a survey see, e.g. [13]. In 2009, Koch and
Skutella [9], defined a new variant of flows over time and introduced the notion of the price
of anarchy for them. This model is based on the deterministic queueing model introduced by
Vickrey [17], in which if at some point in time, more flow tries to enter a link than its capacity
allows, the flow queues up at the link tail and waits until it may actually enter the link. The
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total time spent by a flow particle to traverse a single link is then the sum of the waiting
time in the link queue and the actual time to traverse the link. In the model with flow over
time introduced by Koch and Skutella, every link of a given network has a fixed capacity and
a fixed free flow transit time. The link capacity bounds the maximal rate at which the flow
may traverse the link and the link free flow transit time expresses the time a flow particle
spends traveling from the link tail to its head.
It is a well known property of selfish routing with static flows that adding a new link to
a network does not necessarily decrease the congestion in Nash equilibrium, but, paradoxi-
cally, it may even increase it, and so increase the cost of routing through the network. This
phenomenon, discovered by Braess [2], is called Braess’s paradox. For a survey see, e.g. [14].
For Wardrop’s model of static flows, it is known [10, 14] that the ratio by which the
efficiency of a network may improve by removing any number of its links, i.e. Braess’s ratio,
is at most ⌊n/2⌋, where n is the number of network nodes. This bound is tight [8, 14] for
Wardrop’s model. In this paper, we will prove that this bound does not generalize for the
model of games with flow over time, and that there is a topology which admits a much more
severe Braess’s ratio. For flows over time nothing was known in this respect. Akamatsu and
Heydecker [1] considered similar paradoxes for flows over time from a different point of view.
In principle, the only kind of topology that admits Braess’s paradox in static flows is
the Wheatstone network, see Fig. 1(a), also known as the θ-network. For Wardrop’s model
of static flows, it is known [12] that Braess’s paradox may arise on and only on networks
which contain the Wheatstone network as a topological minor. Recall, that a network H is
called a topological minor of a network G if a subdivision of H is isomorphic to a subgraph
of G. The networks that do not contain the Wheatstone network as a topological minor are
usually called series-parallel [4], as they can be inductively composed by a number of series
and parallel compositions from an edge. In other words, a network admits Braess’s paradox in
Wardrop’s model if and only if it is not series-parallel. We will show that there are networks
which do not admit Braess’s paradox in Wardrop’s model, but which admit it in the model
with flow over time. Thus, we will introduce a class of series-parallel networks, for which there
are instances of the model with flow over time that admit Braess’s paradox. An example of
such a network is shown in Fig. 1(b). Actually, all these networks are even extension-parallel.
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Fig. 1. (a) The Wheatstone network, in principle the only topology that admits Braess’s
paradox in static flows; (b) The new topology for Braess’s paradox in flows over time.
As the Wheatstone network is symmetric, or more precisely, as it is isomorphic to its
transpose, a network G admits Braess’s paradox inWardrop’s model if and only if its transpose
GT admits Braess’s paradox as well. Moreover, we know that an instance of Wardrop’s model
on a network G admits Braess’s paradox if and only if the instance on the transpose network
GT with the same latency functions and the same flow supply admits it as well.
We will illustrate that in the model with flow over time there exist network topologies
which exhibit Braess’s paradox, but for which the transpose does not. Also, we will show that
there is an infinite set of instances of the model with flow over time, which admit Braess’s
paradox, but none of the corresponding instances on their transpose networks with the same
traffic supply and capacities and the same free flow transit times admits it any more. At the
end of this paper, we conjecture a necessary and sufficient condition of existence of Braess’s
paradox in a network, and prove the condition of existence of the paradox either in the network
or in its transpose.
Further discussion on the results can also be found in Macko’s PhD thesis [11].
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide the formal definition of
Koch’s and Skutella’s model of games with flow over time and define all notations we use later
in this paper. Then, in Section 3, we prove the lower bound on Braess’s ratio for the model
of games with flow over time, and we show that there are networks which admit Braess’s
paradox in this model, but which do not admit it in Wardrop’s model. In Section 4, we show
that Braess’s paradox is not symmetric in this model. And finally, in Section 5, we provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions of existence of Braess’s paradox in a network.
2 The Model
In this section, following its original definition introduced by Koch and Skutella [9], we define
the model of games with flow over time.
An instance of a game with flow over time is given by a tuple (G, c, τ, s, t, d), where G is a
network modeled by a directed graph G = (V,E), s ∈ V and t ∈ V are source and sink nodes
of G, respectively, c = {ce}e∈E is a vector of link capacities with all ce > 0, τ = {τe}e∈E is
a vector of link free flow transit times with all τe ≥ 0, and d > 0 is an amount of the game
input supply. We assume that there is at least one path from s to t in G. Let Ps,t denote the
set of all s-t-paths in G. Note that by the term path we mean a simple path.
The fundamental concept to this model are waiting queues that accumulate at the tails
of network links if more flow wants to traverse a link than its capacity allows. Therefore, the
link capacity bounds its outflow, that is the rate at which the flow leaves the link. The total
transit time of a flow particle through a network link e at time θ is the sum of the waiting
time qe(θ) in the link queue at time θ and the link free flow transit time τe. The link free
flow transit time determines the time the flow particle needs to traverse the link after leaving
its waiting queue. The term flow particle represents an infinitesimally small flow unit that
traverses the network along a single path.
For a given link e, the actual link inflow f+e (θ) is a function that determines the flow rate
at which the flow enters the link e at its tail at time θ ≥ 0. Similarly, the actual link outflow
f−e (θ) is a function that determines the flow rate at which the flow leaves the link e at its
head at time θ ≥ 0. We have f+e (θ) ≥ 0 and f
−
e (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ 0. We usually omit the
word actual and write just the link in- and outflow. Further, the cumulative link inflow F+e (θ)
is a function that determines the total amount of flow that entered the link e until θ ≥ 0,
and the cumulative link outflow F−e (θ) is a function that determines the total amount of flow
that left the link e until θ ≥ 0. Thus, F+e (θ) =
∫ θ
0 f
+
e (ϑ)dϑ and F
−
e (θ) =
∫ θ
0 f
−
e (ϑ)dϑ for all
θ ≥ 0. Note that all cumulative in- and outflows are continuous and nondecreasing. A flow
over time is a vector f = {(f+e , f
−
e )}e∈E of pairs of the in- and outflows of all network links.
We say that a flow over time f is feasible if it satisfies the following conditions. The outflow
of every link e ∈ E is upper bounded by its capacity, therefore
f−e (θ) ≤ ce, (1)
for all θ ≥ 0. The flow leaves a link e after and only after it waits in its waiting queue and
then it traverses the whole link, so for all e ∈ E and θ ≥ 0 we have
F+e (θ)− F
−
e (θ + qe(θ) + τe) = 0. (2)
All flow that enters a node v continues immediately into node v out-links, and obviously,
only flow that just entered the node v may continue into its out-links. This condition has
two exceptions, namely the source node and the sink node. The amount of flow that leaves
the source node through its out-links is always larger than the amount of flow that enters it
through its in-links. This difference is exactly the network supply d. Reciprocally, the amount
of flow that enters the sink node through its in-links may be larger than the amount of flow
that leaves it through its out-links. This difference at time θ ≥ 0 is called the actual sink flow
and expresses the amount of flow that successfully finished its route from the source to the
sink node at time θ. We denote it by γ(θ), and again, we usually omit the word actual and
write just the sink flow. The cumulative sink flow Γ (θ) is a function that determines the total
amount of flow that finished its route until θ ≥ 0, hence Γ (θ) =
∫ θ
0 γ(ϑ)dϑ. Therefore, for all
θ ≥ 0 the following condition must hold:
∑
e∈δ−v
f−e (θ) −
∑
e∈δ+v
f+e (θ) =


0 for v ∈ V \ {s, t},
−d if v = s,
γ(θ) if v = t,
(3)
where δ−v and δ
+
v are the sets of all in- and out-links of the node v, respectively.
Finally, the waiting time on any link e may not be negative, and if there is a nonempty
waiting queue on the tail of the link e, the rate, at which the flow leaves the queue, must
utilise the entire link capacity. If a flow particle leaves the waiting queue on the link e at time
θ, then by condition (2), it will leave the link e at time θ + τe. Therefore, if a flow particle
enters the link e at time θ, the cumulative amount of flow that entered the waiting queue
until now is F+e (θ) and the cumulative amount of flow that left the waiting queue until now
is F−e (θ+ τe). Hence, F
+
e (θ)− F
−
e (θ+ τe) is the amount of flow waiting in the queue at time
θ. So, the current waiting time in the queue of the link e ∈ E at time θ ≥ 0 is
qe(θ) =
F+e (θ)− F
−
e (θ + τe)
ce
,
and for all e ∈ E and all θ ≥ 0 the following condition must hold:
qe(θ) ≥ 0 and qe(θ) > 0 ⇒ f
−
e (θ + τe) = ce. (4)
Note that the function θ → θ + qe(θ) is increasing and continuous. This means that no flow
particle may overtake any other flow particle in the link waiting queue. Similarly, it may not
overtake any other flow particle in the rest of the link as well, as the link free flow transit
time is constant for all flow particles. This means that every link in a feasible flow is FIFO.
A game with flow over time is a strategic game, in which every flow particle is an inde-
pendent player with an infinitesimally small amount of traffic. The flows of particular players
enter the network at the source node such that the total amount of flow that entered the
network at any point of time θ ≥ 0 is equal to the game input supply d. Every player, before
his piece of flow enters the network, independently chooses his strategy, that is a path from
the source to the sink node his flow will route along. Then his flow enters the network and
follows this path as quickly as possible. For every network s-t-path p, let fp(θ) denote the
amount of flow that entered the network at time θ ≥ 0 and is going to follow the path p. We
know that
∑
p∈Ps,t
fp(θ) = d for all θ ≥ 0.
Koch and Skutella [9] defined a feasible flow over time to be a Nash equilibrium, or in
other words to be a Nash flow over time, if and only if the flow is sent only over currently
shortest paths, or equivalently, if and only if no flow overtakes any other flow.
For a fixed flow over time, let ℓv(θ) denote the earliest point in time when a flow particle
that entered the network at time θ may arrive at the node v. Then
ℓs(θ) = θ and
ℓw(θ) = min{ℓv(θ) + qe(ℓv(θ)) + τe | e = vw ∈ δ
−
w}
for every node w ∈ V \ {s} and all θ ≥ 0. We call these functions label functions. Note that
the label functions are nondecreasing and continuous.
We say that a flow is sent only over currently shortest paths if for every link e = vw ∈ E
and all θ ≥ 0 we have
ℓw(θ) < ℓv(θ) + qe(ℓv(θ)) + τe ⇒ f
+
e (ℓv(θ)) = 0.
Similarly, we say that no flow overtakes any other flow if, for every flow particle, the amount
of flow that entered the network before this flow particle equals the amount of flow that left
the network before this flow particle. That is, if d · θ = Γ (ℓt(θ)) for all θ ≥ 0.
Koch and Skutella showed that flow over time is sent only over currently shortest paths if
and only if no flow overtakes any other flow. This gives us a pair of handy characterizations of
Nash equilibria for flows over time. Finally, they showed that for every instance of the model
of games with flow over time there exists a flow in a Nash equilibrium.
For convenience in the rest of this paper, let λp(θ) denote the time spent by a flow particle
traveling along a network path p if the flow particle entered the queue at the first link of p at
time θ ≥ 0. We know that if the path p consists only of one link e ∈ E, then λe(θ) = qe(θ)+τe.
If p contains more links, let e1 denote its first link and p
′ the rest of the path p, that is p = e1p
′.
Then λp(θ) = λp′(θ + qe1(θ) + τe1). We call these functions latency functions or latencies.
Further, let λv(θ) denote the shortest time in which a flow particle may get to a node
v ∈ V if the flow particle entered the network source node at time θ ≥ 0. That is, λv(θ) =
minp∈Ps,v{λp(θ)}. Notice that λv(θ) = ℓv(θ)− θ.
In this paper we investigate Braess’s paradox with respect to the social cost function SC,
which expresses the maximum experienced latency of a flow particle. For a feasible flow f of
an instance A of a game with flow over time, it is defined as follows:
SC(f) = sup
θ≥0
max
p∈Ps,t
(
[fp(θ) > 0] · λp(θ)
)
.
So, we are taking into account the supremum of the latencies of all paths over the points in
time in which a non-negligible amount of flow used the particular path. By a non-negligible
amount of flow we mean a strictly positive amount of flow.
For every instance of a game with flow over time, we believe, that all its Nash flows are in
principle equivalent, in the sense that their social costs are equal. However, this has not yet
been proven. So we define the Braess’s ratio with respect to the worst case Nash flow, where
by the worst Nash flow we mean the Nash flow with the highest social cost. Nevertheless, all
instances of games with flow over time we use in our proofs have all their Nash flows provably
equivalent.
Let A = (G, c, τ, s, t, d) be an instance of a game with flow over time on a network G and
f∗ its worst Nash flow. We say that BR(A) is Braess’s ratio of the instance A with respect
to the social cost function SC, and define it as follows:
BR(A) = max
{
SC(f∗)
SC(f∗H)
∣∣∣∣ H ⊆ G
}
,
where f∗H is the worst Nash flow of the instance (H, c, τ, s, t, d) on the subgraph H. Braess’s
ratio of a nonempty class of instances of games with flow over time is the supremum of Braess’s
ratios of particular instances.
We say that an instance admits Braess’s paradox if its Braess’s ratio is strictly greater
than one. Similarly, we say that a network admits Braess’s paradox if there is an instance on
this network with its Braess’s ratio strictly greater than one.
For simplicity, we will write the value of the social cost SC(f∗) of the worst Nash flow f∗
of an instance A as SC∗(A).
3 Lower Bound on Braess’s Ratio
In this section we provide a lower bound on Braess’s ratio for the model of games with flow
over time, and we show that there is a topology which admits Braess’s paradox in this model,
but which does not admit it in games with static flows.
Let’s consider an instance An := (Mn, c, τ, s, t, d) of a game with flow over time on the
network Mn, for n ≥ 2, as shown in Fig. 2 with the source node s = v1 and the sink node
t = vn. The input supply of the network is d = α0. The free flow transit times and the
capacities of the network links are defined as follows: τek = 0, τfk = T and cek = αk, for
1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, cfk = αk−1 − αk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 and cfn−1 = αn−2, where T > 0 and
0 < αn−1 < · · · < α2 < α1 < α0 = d. Let p1 denote the s-t-path consisting of the single link
f1, pk the s-t-path e1e2 . . . ek−1fk, for 2 ≤ k < n, consisting of several e-links and the link fk,
and finally let p0 denote the path e1e2 . . . en−1 that uses only e-links, but no f -link. We will
show that Braess’s ratio of such an instance may be arbitrarily close to n− 1, depending only
on α’s we choose.
In every Nash equilibrium at time zero, all first flow particles follow only the path p0, as it
is the only s-t-path with zero free flow transit time and so the only s-t-path with zero latency.
As d > ce1 > ce2 > · · · > cen−1 , a linearly increasing waiting queue accumulates on every
e-link and the total transit times on the path p0 and all paths pk (k ≥ 2) linearly increase
with the time when a flow particle entered the network. Since the queue accumulates on every
e-link and the free flow transit times of all f -links are equal, the latency on every path pk is
strictly greater than the latency on the path pk−1 at any positive time θ when a flow particle
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Fig. 2. The network Mn. The network topology which admits a severe Braess’s Paradox
for congestion games with flows over time, but which does not admit the paradox for
Wardrop’s model. All these networks are series-parallel, and even extension-parallel.
entered the network, until time θ1 when the latency on the path p0 reaches T . At this time,
the latency on the path p0 is equal to the latency on the path p1. Therefore, any flow particle
that enters the network at time θ1 may follow either the path p0 or the path p1, but not any
other path.
After time θ1, if n ≥ 3, the network supply splits between the paths p0 and p1 in such a way
that the latency on the path p1 begins to increase uniformly with the latency on the path p0.
In particular, the path p0 will gain the amount of αn−1/(α0−α1+αn−1) and the path p1 the
amount of (α0−α1)/(α0−α1+αn−1) portions of the supply d. As d·αn−1/(α0−α1+αn−1) < α1,
the latency on the link e1 decreases and the waiting queue on the link shortens after time θ1.
If we are able to choose α’s such that the link e1 never drains, the link outflow stays constant
and equal to α1 forever, and the flow on the network induced by the nodes v2 to vn behaves
the same way as a flow on the network Mn−1 of the instance An−1 with an input supply equal
to α1.
Indeed, if we choose α’s such that none of the e-links ever drains, the latency on the
link en−1 will increase up to T , eventually, with the latencies on all other e-links positive.
Therefore, the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle will be strictly greater
than T . The next lemma shows that there are α’s such that the maximum experienced transit
time of a flow particle in the instance An is almost (n− 1) · T .
Lemma 1. Let n ≥ 2, 0 < ε < 1/2n, j ≥ 1 and αk = 1 + ε
j+k, for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. In every
Nash equilibrium, the transit time λt(θ) of a flow particle that entered the instance An at time
θ > T/εj+n is:
λt(θ) > (1− 2nε) · (n− 1) · T.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on n. If n = 2 the network M2 consists of only
two parallel links e1 and f1 with capacities α1 and α0, respectively. In every Nash equilibrium,
as α0 > α1, the time spent traveling through the network M2 by a flow particle that entered
the network at time θ > T/εj+2 > T · 1+ε
j+1
εj−εj+1
= T · α1
α0−α1
is λt(θ) = T > (1− 4ε) · T .
Now, let’s assume that n ≥ 3, and consider any fixed Nash flow. The cheapest s-t-path
at the beginning of the game is the path p0, as it is the only s-t-path with zero free flow
transit time. So, in every Nash flow, all first flow particles follow only this path. Therefore,
the latency on the path p0 increases linearly with the time when a flow particle entered the
network, until it becomes equal to the latency on some other path p, when the flow particles
start to follow also the path p. Since then, the latencies on both paths p0 and p grow evenly
until they grow up to the latency on some other path, and so on. Eventually, the flow particles
will start to use all paths p1 to pn−1, since the total capacity of the network after removing
any f -link is smaller than the network supply d.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, let θk denote the point in time when the first flow particle which
followed the path pk entered the network. Since the free flow times of all f -links are equal,
we know that:
θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θn−1.
Further, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, let µk denote the point in time when the first flow particle which
followed the path pk entered the link fk. Clearly θ1 = µ1 and θk ≤ µk, for k ≥ 2. Then µk
is the point in time when the cumulative amount of flow that entered the link ek minus the
cumulative amount of flow that left the link en−1 divided by the link en−1 capacity is exactly
the latency on the empty link fk. That is the total waiting time on the path ekek+1 . . . en−1,
for a flow particle that enters the link ek at time µk, is T . Therefore µk = T ·
αn−1
αk−1−αn−1
.
If a flow particle enters the network at time θ ∈ [0, θ1) it may follow only the path p0.
So, the amount of traffic that enters the link e1 at time θ is exactly the network supply d.
Therefore, the latency on the link e1 at time θ1 is:
λe1(θ1) = θ1 ·
α0 − α1
α1
= µ1 ·
α0 − α1
α1
= T ·
αn−1
α0 − αn−1
·
α0 − α1
α1
= T ·
[
1−
α0(α1 − αn−1)
α1(α0 − αn−1)
]
= T ·
[
1− ε ·
1 + εj
1 + εj+1
·
1− εn−2
1− εn−1
]
> T · (1− 2ε).
If a flow particle enters the network at time θ ∈ [θk−1, θk), for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, it may follow
only paths p0 to pk−1. Since the capacity of the path p1 is α0 − α1 and the total capacity of
the network induced by paths p0 and p2 to pk−1 is α1 − αk−1 + αn−1, the amount of traffic
that follow the link e1 at time θ is:
γk := α0 ·
(α1 − αk−1 + αn−1)
(α1 − αk−1 + αn−1) + (α0 − α1)
= α0 ·
α1 − αk−1 + αn−1
α0 − αk−1 + αn−1
.
As γk < α1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, the accumulated queue on the link e1 decreases during the
time between θ1 and θn−1.
Finally, if a flow particle enters the network at time θ ≥ θn−1 it may follow all s-t-paths.
Since the total capacity of the network Mn is equal to the network supply, the amount of
traffic that follow the link e1 at time θ is γn := α1, that is exactly the capacity of the link
e1. Therefore the accumulated queue on the link e1 remains constant after time θn−1 and
λe1(θ) = λe1(θn−1) for all θ ≥ θn−1.
Remark that γk+1 − γk < ε
jα0(αk−1 − αn−1) for 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. We show that despite
the fact that the latency on the link e1 decreases between the time θ1 and θn−1, it does not
decrease too much:
λe1(θn−1) = λe1(θ1)−
n−1∑
k=2
α1 − γk
α1
(θk − θk−1)
> λe1(θ1)−
n−1∑
k=2
γk+1 − γk
α1
θk
≥ λe1(θ1)−
n−1∑
k=2
γk+1 − γk
α1
µk
> λe1(θ1)−
n−1∑
k=2
T ·
εjα0(αk−1 − αn−1)
α1
·
αn−1
αk−1 − αn−1
> λe1(θ1)−
n−1∑
k=2
T · 2εj > T · (1− 2nε).
So, the accumulated queue on the link e1 never drains and its outflow is always constant and
equal to its capacity α1. Therefore, we can view the flow in the network induced by nodes v2
to vn as the instance An−1 on the network Mn−1 with the input supply α1.
By induction hypothesis we know that for every time θ > T/ε(j+1)+(n−1) the time spent
traveling along the path e2e3 . . . en−1 by a flow particle that entered the path at time θ is:
λe2e3...en−1(θ) > (1− 2(n− 1)ε) · ((n − 1)− 1) · T > (1− 2nε) · (n− 2) · T.
As θn−1 ≤ µn−1 < T/ε
j+n, at any time θ > T/εj+n, the time spent traveling through the
network Mn by a flow particle that entered the network at time θ is:
λt(θ) = λe1(θ) + λe2e3...en−1(θ + λe1(θ))
= λe1(θn−1) + λe2e3...en−1(θ + λe1(θ))
> (1− 2nε) · T + (1− 2nε) · (n− 2) · T
= (1− 2nε) · (n− 1) · T. ⊓⊔
The previous lemma shows that the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle,
in a Nash equilibrium of An, may be arbitrarily close to (n − 1) · T , where n is the number
of network nodes. The following theorem shows that there is a subgraph of Mn, for which
the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium is almost
n− 1 times better than in the original graph.
Theorem 2. For every ε > 0 and n ≥ 3, the network Mn has a subgraph H such that, for
the instance An = (Mn, c, τ, s, t, d) we have:
SC∗(Mn, c, τ, s, t, d) > (1− ε) · (n− 1) · SC
∗(H, c, τ, s, t, d).
Proof. Let H be the network Mn with the link en−1 removed. We see that free flow transit
times of all s-t-paths in H are the same and equal to T . Moreover the total capacity of the
network H is equal to the supply d = α0, therefore in every Nash flow at any time θ ≥ 0 all
flow supply distributes between the s-t-paths evenly and no waiting queues begin to build on
any link. So the network transit time remains constant and SC∗(H, c, τ, s, t, d) = λt(θ) = T ,
for all θ ≥ 0.
By Lemma 1 we know that SC∗(An) > (1− 2nε
′) · (n − 1) · T for every sufficiently small
ε′. So, for ε′ := ε/2n, we have:
SC∗(An) > (1− ε) · (n− 1) · T = (1− ε) · (n− 1) · SC
∗(H, c, τ, s, t, d). ⊓⊔
Therefore, if we choose a sufficiently small ε, Braess’s ratio of the instance An gets arbi-
trarily close to n− 1.
Corollary 3 (Lower bound on Braess’s ratio). For every n ≥ 3, Braess’s ratio of the
class In of all instances of the game with flow over time on networks with n nodes is BR(In) ≥
n− 1.
Corollary 4 (A new topology for Braess’s paradox). For every n ≥ 3, there is a
network with n nodes, which admits Braess’s paradox in the model of games with flow over
time, but which does not admit it in Wardrop’s model. In particular, it is the network Mn.
The construction in Lemma 1 also works if we restrict the model to instances with only
integer link capacities. For a given ε from the lemma, take the smallest integer a such that
1/2a ≤ ε, and let αk = 2
a(n+j) +2a(n−k). By a proof similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can
show that in a Nash equilibrium the transit time of a flow particle that entered the network
at time θ > T · 2a(j+n) is more than (1− n/2a−1) · (n− 1) · T .
If we restrict the model only to instances with unit link capacities, the lower bound
on Braess’s ratio as a function of the number of network nodes still holds. We only need
to replace every network link with integer capacity c by a set of c parallel links with unit
capacities. However, in this case, the number of network links grows exponentially with n and
polynomially with 1/ε.
4 Asymmetry of Braess’s Paradox
For every n ≥ 3, we have shown that the instance An as defined in the previous section
has Braess’s ratio arbitrarily close to n − 1 for sufficiently small ε, and so it admits Braess’s
paradox. Now, we will show that the instance on the transpose network with the same traffic
supply and the same link capacities and free flow times has Braess’s ratio equal to 1.
b
v1 = t
′
b
v2
b
v3
b
vn−1
b
vn = s
′
e1e2
. . .
en−1
f1
f2
f3
fn−1
...
Fig. 3. The transpose MTn of the network Mn, which admits no Braess’s paradox in the
model of games with flow over time.
Consider an instance ATn := (M
T
n , c, τ, s
′, t′, d) on the network MTn , for n ≥ 2, as shown
in Fig. 3, with an input supply d = α0. The network M
T
n is a transpose of the network Mn,
that is the network Mn with all its links reversed and its source and sink nodes swapped.
Therefore, the MTn source and sink nodes are s
′ = vn and t
′ = v1, respectively, and the free
flow transit times and the capacities of its links are defined as follows: τek = 0, τfk = T and
cek = αk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, cfk = αk−1 − αk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 and cfn−1 = αn−2, where
T > 0 and 0 < αn−1 < · · · < α2 < α1 < α0 = d. Similarly, denote p
T
k as the reverse of the
path pk. Therefore, p
T
0 is the path en−1en−2 . . . e1 and p
T
k is the path fkek−1ek−2 . . . e1, for
k ≥ 1.
We will show, that for all n ≥ 2 the instance ATn does not admit Braess’s paradox. That is,
there is no subgraph H of the network MTn , for which the maximum experienced transit time
of a flow particle in any Nash equilibrium of the instance (H, c, τ, s′, t′, d) would be smaller
than the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in any Nash equilibrium of the
instance ATn .
Lemma 5. For every n ≥ 2, Braess’s ratio of the instance ATn is BR(A
T
n ) = 1.
Proof. At the beginning of the game ATn , in every Nash equilibrium, all first flow particles
follow only the path pT0 , as it is the only cheapest s-t-path in the networkM
T
n . As the capacity
αn−1 of the first link on the path p
T
0 , the link en−1, is strictly smaller than the network supply
α0 and smaller than the capacities of all other e-links on the path, it is the only link on which
a queue begins to accumulate. Therefore, the latencies on all other links remain constant.
The queue on the link en−1 will grow until the latency on this link become equal to T . At
this point of time, the latencies on all s-t-paths will become the same and equal to T . So,
the traffic will start to split evenly among all s-t-paths and no queues will grow any more,
as the network supply is not larger than the total capacity of the network MTn . Therefore,
the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium of the
instance ATn is T . So, SC
∗(ATn ) = T .
Now, take a subgraph H of the network MTn and let H := (H, c, τ, s
′, t′, d) denote the
instance of the game on the network H. If H = MTn , then Nash equilibria of both instances
are the same and SC∗(H) = SC∗(ATn ). So, assume H is a proper subset of M
T
n . If H misses
any other link then en−1, it is easy to check, that its total capacity is strictly less than the
network supply α0 and so SC
∗(H) is unbounded. If H contains all links except en−1 the total
capacity of the network is equal to the supply d = α0 and the free flow transit times of all
s-t-paths in H are equal to T . Therefore, in every Nash equilibrium, the traffic splits evenly
among all s-t-paths since the beginning of the game and no waiting queues build on any
link. Thus, the network transit time is constant and equal to T forever. So, SC∗(H) = T and
BR(ATn ) = 1. ⊓⊔
We have proved, that none of the instances ATn admits Braess’s paradox. In fact, it is
possible to show that there is no Braess’s paradox even for the instance (MTn , c, τ, s
′, t′, d)
with any d ≤ α0, not just d = α0.
By Theorem 2, for every n ≥ 3, we know that Braess’s ratio of the instance An is arbitrarily
close to n−1, and so the instance An admits a rather severe Braess’s paradox. Thus, together
with the previous lemma, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 6 (Braess’s paradox asymmetry). For every n ≥ 3, there is an instance of
a game with flow over time on a network G with n nodes, which admits Braess’s paradox,
but for which the corresponding instance on the transpose network GT does not admit it. In
particular, it is the instance An.
So, there is an instance on the network M3, see Fig. 4(a), namely A3, that admits Braess’s
paradox, and we have shown that the instance AT3 on the transpose networkM
T
3 , see Fig. 4(b),
with the same flow supply and the same link capacities and free flow times does not admit it.
In fact, for this particular transpose network, there is no instance which would have Braess’s
ratio strictly larger than 1, and so, which would admit Braess’s paradox.
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Fig. 4. (a) M3; (b) MT3 ; (c) M
′
3; (d) M
′′
3 .
Theorem 7 (Braess’s paradox asymmetry for networks). There is a network G with
an instance of the game with flow over time that admits Braess’s paradox, for which there
is no instance of the game with flow over time on its transpose GT that would admit the
paradox. In particular, it is the network M3.
Proof. Let G = M3, by theorem 2, we know that the instance A3 on the network M3 has
the Braess’s ratio arbitrarily close to 2 for sufficiently small ε, hence, it admits the Braess’s
paradox.
Now, take some instance B = (MT3 , c, τ, s, t, d) on the transpose M
T
3 of the network M3.
If the network supply d is larger than the total capacity of the union of all paths from the
network source node s to the network sink node t, then the maximum experienced transit time
of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium is unbounded. As no subgraph of the network MT3
has its total capacity larger than the total capacity of the entire network MT3 , the maximum
experienced transit time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium of every MT3 subgraph
is unbounded as well. Therefore the instance B does not admit the Braess’s paradox.
Thus, let’s assume that the network supply d is at most the total capacity of the union of
all paths from the network source node s to the network sink node t. If the instance has the
network source and sink nodes chosen differently than in Figure 4(b), then there is no path
from s to t in MT3 , or the set of all s-t-paths forms a subgraph with only one or two parallel
links from s to t. In either case, the instance does not admit the Braess’s paradox, trivially.
So, let’s assume that the source and sink nodes of the instance B are chosen as shown in
Figure 4(b), and consider any fixed Nash equilibrium of the instance B. Denote p1 the path
e2e1, p2 the path f2e1, and p3 the path f1, where e1, e2, f1 and f2 are the network links as
shown in the Figure. For 0 ≤ k ≤ 2, denote tk the time when the first flow particle may enter
the path pk in the Nash equilibrium, that is the time when the path pk becomes one of the
shortest s-t-paths. Note that, in general, even if a path becomes one of the shortest s-t-paths,
the flow particles may but do not have to use it at all if there is a sufficient capacity on the
remaining shortest s-t-paths. If the path pk never becomes one of the shortest s-t-paths in
the Nash equilibrium, we say that tk = ∞. Also note that after a path becomes one of the
shortest paths, it remains among the shortest paths forever.
By checking out all possibilities on relative order of the times tk, we will show that the
instance B may not admit the Braess’s paradox. So, take a subgraph H of the network MT3 .
We will show that the maximum experienced transit time SC(B′) of a traffic particle in every
Nash equilibrium of the instance B′ = (H, c, τ, s, t, d) restricted to H is at least the maximum
experienced transit time SC(B) of a traffic particle in the chosen Nash equilibrium of the
instance B on the original network MT3 :
– If t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 < ∞ then the free flow transit time of the path p1 is not bigger than the
free flow transit time of the path p2, which is not bigger than the free flow transit time
of the path p3, that is τe2 ≤ τf2 and τf2 + τe1 ≤ τf1 . As t3 <∞, the path p3 becomes one
of the shortest s-t-paths at the time t3, therefore the transit time of every flow particle
that enters the network at this time is exactly τf1. Since both t1 and t2 are at most t3, the
paths p1 and p2 are the shortest s-t-paths at the time t3 as well. Therefore, all network
paths are used since t3, and their total capacity is sufficient for the network supply d.
So, the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in the Nash equilibrium is
SC(B) = τf1. Now, we have three cases:
• If t2 < t3 then the total capacity of the paths p1 and p2 is strictly smaller than the
network supply d, as their transit times grow until t3, when the transit times of all
three paths become equal. Therefore, if p3 6⊆ H the maximum experienced transit
time SC(B′) of a flow particle in the Nash equilibrium of B′ is unbounded. However, if
p3 ⊆ H the path p3 is used in the equilibrium, and the maximum experienced transit
time SC(B′) of a flow particle is at least τf1.
• If t1 < t2 and t2 = t3 then the capacity of the path p1 is strictly smaller than d.
Therefore, if neither p2 ⊆ H nor p3 ⊆ H, then SC(B
′) is unbounded. Otherwise, if
p2 ⊆ H or p3 ⊆ H, then at least one of these paths is used by the flow, and so
SC(B′) ≥ τf2 + τe1 = τf1 .
• If t1 = t2 and t2 = t3 then the free flow transit times of all three paths are equal and
SC(B′) = τe2 + τe1 = τf2 + τe1 = τf1or is unbounded, depending on the total capacity
of H.
– If max{t1, t3} < t2 <∞ then the total capacity of the paths p1 and p3 is strictly smaller
than d. If ce2 would not be smaller then ce1, the total capacity of the entire network M
T
3
would be smaller than d, therefore ce2 < ce1. As ce2 < ce1 and the link f2 belongs only
to the path p2, the link e1 does not accumulate any waiting queue and its transit time
remains τe1 forever. Therefore, the transit time of the path p2 at the time t2, when it
becomes one of the shortest paths, is exactly τf2 + τe1 . Hence, SC(B) = τf2 + τe1.
Now, if p2 6⊆ H, then SC(B
′) is unbounded, since the total capacity of the paths p1 and
p3 is smaller than d. If p2 ⊆ H, then SC(B
′) is at least the free flow transit time of the
path p2, that is τf2 + τe1.
– If t3 < t1 = t2 < ∞ then τf1 < τf2 + τe1 = τe2 + τe1 and cf1 < d. Therefore, SC(B) =
τe2 + τe1. Now, if p1 ⊆ H or p2 ⊆ H, then SC(B
′) ≥ τe2 + τe1. Otherwise, SC(B
′) is
unbounded.
– If t1 ≤ t2 < t3 = ∞ then τe2 ≤ τf2 and τf2 + τe1 < τf1. As t3 = ∞, the path p3 never
becomes the shortest path, and so is never used. Hence, d ≤ ce1 and no queue accumulates
on the link e1. Therefore, SC(B) = τf2 + τe1.
Now, if the remainder of the paths p1 and p2 in H has its total capacity at least d, then
SC(B′) = τf2 + τe1, Otherwise, the path p3 is used, provided that it belongs to H. In this
case SC(B′) ≥ τf1 > τf2 + τe1. If neither the remainder of the paths p1 and p2 in H has
sufficient capacity nor p3 ⊆ H, then SC(B
′) is unbounded.
– The cases if t1 ≤ t3 < t2 =∞ and if t3 ≤ t1 < t2 =∞ are analogous to the previous case.
– If t1 < t2 = t3 = ∞ then τe2 < τf2 and τe2 + τe1 < τf1. Moreover, the paths p2 and p3
are never used and the path p1 has enough capacity to support the entire input supply
d. Hence, SC(B) = τe2 + τe1. Now, if p1 ⊆ H, then SC(B
′) = τe2 + τe1. Otherwise,
the flow particles in H must use some of the remaining paths. In this case, SC(B′) ≥
min{τf1 , τf2 + τe1} > τe2 + τe1.
– The case if t3 < t1 = t2 =∞ is analogous to the previous case.
– Finally, the cases if t2 < t1 are symmetric to the cases if t1 < t2. ⊓⊔
5 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Braess’s Paradox
In this section, we would like to answer the question, which topologies in general admit
Braess’s paradox in the model of games with flow over time. So, we would like to characterize
the class of all such networks in this model. Foremost, we show that every network which
contains either the network M3, or its variations, the network M
′
3 (see Fig. 4(c)) or the
network M ′′3 (see Fig. 4(d)) as a topological minor admits Braess’s paradox in this model,
and then we conjecture that these three networks are essentially the only topologies that
admit Braess’s paradox in this model in general.
The networks M ′3 and M
′′
3 are very similar to M3. If we set the free flow transit times
and the link capacities in these two networks the same way as in the network M3 with the
only difference that τg = 0 and cg = d, where d is the network supply, the instances on
the networks M ′3, M
′′
3 and M3 act the same way, and their social costs and Braess’s ratios
are equal. Therefore, both M ′3 and M
′′
3 admit Braess’s paradox, since M3 admits it. Notice
that despite their similarity, the networks M3, M
′
3 and M
′′
3 are not topological minors of
each other. The conjecture that these three networks are essentially the only topologies that
admit Braess’s paradox is motivated by the result, we investigate at the end of this section,
that these three networks together with the network MT3 are the only topologies that admit
Braess’s paradox if we use the network both ways, the forward and also the reverse.
Theorem 8 (Sufficient condition for Braess’s paradox). If a network G contains either
the network M3, M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a topological minor, then it admits Braess’s paradox in the
model of games with flow over time.
Proof. If the network G contains M3 as a topological minor then the network G contains a
subgraph that can be constructed from M3 by a number of link subdivisions. Therefore, there
are nodes v1, v2 and v3 in G connected to each other by four independent paths, as shown in
Fig. 5. We will call them subdivided paths and their links subdivided links. Take one link of
each subdivided path and denote it by e1, e2, f1 or f2, respectively, as shown in the figure.
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Fig. 5. M3 as a topological minor of a network G.
Now, consider an instance of the game with flow over time B = (G, c, τ, s, t, d) on the
network G with the source node s = v1, the sink node t = v3, and the network input
supply d = α0. The free flow transit times and the link capacities are defined as follows:
τe1 = τe2 = 0, τf1 = τf2 = T , ce1 = α1, ce2 = α2, cf1 = α0 − α1 and cf2 = α1, where T > 0
and 0 < α2 < α1 < α0 = d. Further, set the free flow transit times of all other subdivided
links to zero and the free flow transit times of all other network links to some sufficiently big
constant, say 3 · T . The capacities of all links except e1, e2, f1 and f2 are set to α0, i.e., the
amount of the network supply.
This instance restricted to the subdivided paths is equivalent to the instance A3. The
highest experienced transit time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium of the instance
A3 is arbitrarily close to 2 · T , as shown in Lemma 1, but not more then 2 · T . So, no flow
particle in any Nash equilibrium of the instance B uses any non-subdivided link, as the transit
times on all non-subdivided links are much bigger. Therefore, the highest experienced transit
time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium of the instance on the entire network G is
arbitrarily close to 2 · T , as well.
Similarly, all Nash equilibria of the instances B and A3 on respective networks with the
links e2 removed are equivalent, and the highest experienced transit times of flow particles in
their Nash equilibria are the same and equal to T . Hence, Braess’s ratio of the instance B is
at least 2, and so the network G admits Braess’s paradox.
If the network G contains M ′3 or M
′′
3 as a topological minor then the proof is analogous,
with the only difference that the free flow transit times of links subdivided from the link g
are set to 0 and their capacities are set to the network supply α0. ⊓⊔
Conjecture 9 (Necessary and sufficient condition for Braess’s paradox). A network G admits
Braess’s paradox in the model of games with flow over time if and only if the network G
contains either the network M3, M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a topological minor.
Another natural question to ask is, which topologies admit Braess’s paradox if we would
like to use the networks in both directions. That is, if every network could be used in the way
it is defined to route the traffic from its source to its sink, and also if we could transpose it
and use it to route the traffic in the opposite direction from the original sink to the original
source traveling along reversed links.
A network in Wardrop’s model admitted Braess’s paradox if and only if its transpose
admitted it. However, as we have shown, this is not the case for the model of games with
flow over time. So, for the model of games with flow over time, we would like to characterize
the class of networks which admit Braess’s paradox either in their original or in their reverse
direction.
By Theorem 8, for every network G, we know that either the network G or its transpose
GT admits Braess’s paradox in the model of games with flow over time if the network G
contains either the networkM3,M
′
3 orM
′′
3 as a topological minor or its transpose G
T contains
a transpose of any of these three networks as a topological minor. This is equivalent to
the condition that the network G contains either the network M3, M
T
3 , M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a
topological minor, since the networks M ′3 and M
′′
3 are symmetric, i.e., they are isomorphic to
their transposes.
Call a network a chain of parallel paths if it can be constructed from a chain of parallel
links by a number of link subdivisions, see Fig. 6 for illustration. We say that two nodes u
and v of a network use a chain of parallel paths if the union of all paths from u to v is a
chain of parallel paths, or there is no path from u to v in the network. Further, we say that a
network uses only chains of parallel paths if every pair of the network nodes uses a chain of
parallel paths.
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Fig. 6. (a) Example of a chain of parallel paths; (b) and the corresponding chain of
parallel links.
We will show that the networks that use only chains of parallel paths are the only networks
that contain neither the network M3, M
T
3 , M
′
3 nor M
′′
3 as a topological minor. Then we will
show that no network that uses only chains of parallel paths admits Braess’s paradox in the
model of games with flow over time. This will give us a necessary and sufficient condition of
existence of Braess’s paradox either in a network or in its transpose.
Lemma 10. A network G uses only chains of parallel paths if and only if it does not contain
any of the networks M3, M
T
3 , M
′
3 and M
′′
3 as a topological minor.
Proof. If the network G contains M3 as a topological minor, then it has a subgraph that is
a subdivision of M3. As M3 is not a chain of parallel paths, neither its subdivision nor the
entire network G uses only chains of parallel paths. The same holds if the network G contains
MT3 , M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a topological minor.
Now, let’s assume the network G does not use only chains of parallel paths. We will prove
that it contains at least one of the four networks mentioned above as a topological minor. As
G does not use only chains of parallel paths, it has two nodes u and v, for which the union of
all paths from u to v is not a chain of parallel paths. If there are more such pairs of nodes,
take the pair with the smallest corresponding union of paths, that is the one with minimal
number of links, and denote it by H. The chosen union H of paths does not contain a cut
vertex, that is a node that would separate u from v. If it contained one, say w, at least one
of the unions of paths from u to w or from w to v would not be a chain of parallel paths and
would be smaller than the original union of paths.
As H does not contain a cut vertex, we know by Menger theorem that it contains at lest
two independent paths from u to v. Take a maximal set of independent paths from u to v in
H and denote it by P . Since H is not a chain of parallel paths, there is a path p in H which
does not belong to P , but which intersects at least one path from P in a node different to
u and v. Let v0, e1, v1, e2, . . . , ek, vk denote the nodes and links of p in order from u to v,
respectively. Naturally v0 = u and vk = v. Now we have two cases:
If the link e1 does not belong to any P path, then take the first node (except u) of p that
belongs to some P path. As p intersects with some P path in a node different to u and v, the
graph H contains MT3 as a topological minor.
If e1 belongs to some P path, then take the first link ei of p that does not lie on this P
path. Such link exists, since p 6∈ P , and it does not belong to any P path, since P paths are
independent. Let vj denote the first node of p after ei which belongs to some P path. If vj = v
then H contains M3 as a topological minor. Otherwise, the path p intersects some P path
again. If it is the same P path as the first p link belongs to, i.e., if vj and e1 belong to the
same P path, then H contains M ′3 (see Fig. 4(c)) as a topological minor. If it is some other
P path, then H contains M ′′3 (see Fig. 4(d)) as a topological minor. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. If a network G uses only chains of parallel paths, then it does not admit Braess’s
paradox in the model of games with flow over time.
Proof. Foremost, take a chain of parallel links H with a source and sink nodes s and t,
respectively, such that every H link belongs to some s-t-path. We will show that no instance
B = (H, c, τ, s, t, d) on the network H admits Braess’s paradox. We have two cases:
If H consists of only two nodes s and t and m parallel links e1, e2, . . . , em from s to t,
then, without loss of generality, assume that τe1 ≤ τe2 ≤ · · · ≤ τem, and take the smallest
integer k such that the network supply d ≤ ce1 + ce2 + · · ·+ cek . It is easy to see that the flow
particles in every Nash equilibrium of this instance begin to use the links e1, e2, e3, and so,
consecutively in order by their free flow transit times, until they will eventually use all links
up to ek with their total capacity sufficient for the network supply. Therefore, the inflow on
the sink node never decreases and eventually stabilizes on d. Similarly, the transit time of
flow particles does not decrease and eventually stabilizes at its maximum equal to τek .
If we remove a set of links from H, such that the new total network capacity is still at
least the network supply, the index k of the most expensive used link may not decrease, and
so the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in any Nash equilibrium may not
decrease as well. Therefore, the instance B does not admit Braess’s paradox. Note, that the
same holds even if the network supply is not just a constant d, but also if it is a nondecreasing
function that eventually stabilizes on d. If we removed the links from H, such that the new
total network capacity would be strictly smaller than the network supply, then the maximum
experienced transit time of a flow particle in the new network would be unbounded. Hence,
it would not decrease.
If H contains n nodes, n ≥ 3, then it is a chain of n − 1 sets of parallel links. Denote its
nodes by s = v1, v2, . . . , vn = t in order of their distance from s. We can decompose H into
n − 1 subgraphs such that the subgraph Hk contains the nodes vk and vk+1 and the links
connecting them, where 1 ≤ k < n. Every flow particle traverses the subgraphs in the fixed
order. Moreover, in every Nash equilibrium, any two flow particles that enter the subgraph
Hk at the same moment leave it at the same moment as well, as they both choose only
the currently shortest paths from vk to vk+1. So, every pair of flow particles that enters the
network H together, enters every subgraph Hk together. Hence, in every Nash equilibrium of
B, the behaviour of all flow particles in the subgraph Hk is equivalent to their behaviour in
some Nash equilibrium of the instance Bk = (Hk, c, τ, vk, vk+1, d(θ)) restricted to the subgraph
Hk with the network supply function d(θ) equal to the outflow on the node vk.
From the case for chains of parallel links with only two nodes, we know that the transit
times of flow particles in every Nash equilibrium of Bk eventually stabilizes on its maximum
value. So, the maximum experienced transit time of a flow particle in every Nash equilibrium
of B is the sum of maximum experienced transit times of flow particles in Nash equilibria of
all Bk. As no removal of any Hk links may cause any decrease of the maximum experienced
transit time in any Nash equilibrium of Bk, it may not decrease the maximum experienced
transit time in any Nash equilibrium of B as well. Therefore the instance B does not admit
Braess’s paradox.
Now, take a network G that uses only chains of parallel paths. We will show that no
instance of a game with flow over time on the network G admits Braess’s paradox. So, take
an instance A = (G, c, τ, s, t, d) of such a game on the network G. As G uses only chains of
parallel paths, the union of all paths from s to t is a chain of parallel paths, denote it by
H. As no flow particle of the instance A may use any non-H link, the instance A admits the
paradox if and only if its restriction A′ = (H, c, τ, s, t, d) to the subgraph H admits it as well.
Note that if a graphX ′ is created from a graphX by a link smoothing (an inverse operation
to the link subdivision), in which two consecutive X links e1 and e2 are smoothed out into one
X ′ link e, such that τ ′e = τe1 + τe2 and c
′
e = min{ce1 , ce2}, assuming that neither the network
source nor the network sink node was smoothed out, then the instances (X ′, c′, τ ′, s, t, d) and
(X, c, τ, s, t, d) are equivalent in a sense that all flow particles behave the same way in both
instances. Therefore, both instances admit the paradox if and only if the other one admits it
as well.
So, take an instance B = (H ′, c′, τ ′, s, t, d) on a network H ′ created from H by a maxi-
mal number of link smoothings possible, with the free flow transit times and link capacities
adjusted appropriately. As H is a union of s-t-paths in G, no link enters s nor leaves t, and
thus it is not possible to smooth s nor t out. Therefore, both nodes s and t remain in H ′.
Moreover, H ′ is a chain of parallel links, since H is a chain of parallel paths, however, we know
that no instance on a chain of parallel links admits Braess’s paradox. Therefore, according
the previous paragraph, neither the instance B nor the instance A admits it. ⊓⊔
Thus, from the previous lemmas and the fact that a network admits Braess’s paradox in
the model of games with flow over time if it contains either M3, M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a topological
minor, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 12 (Necessary and sufficient condition for Braess’s paradox both-ways).
For any network G, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Either the network G or its transpose GT admits Braess’s paradox in the model of games
with flow over time.
(ii) The network G contains either M3, M
T
3 , M
′
3 or M
′′
3 as a topological minor.
(iii) The network G does not use only chains of parallel paths.
6 Conclusion
We have proved several new properties of Braess’s paradox for congestion games with flow
over time. However, a number of questions have been left open.
We showed that there are networks which do not admit Braess’s paradox in games with
static flows, but which admit it in the model with flow over time. We showed that these
networks admit a much more severe Braess’s ratio for this model. In particular, we showed
that Braess’s ratio of the class of all instances of games with flow over time on networks with
n nodes is at least n− 1. What is the upper bound on Braess’s ratio for this model?
Then, we illustrated that Braess’s paradox is not symmetric for flows over time, although
it is symmetric for the case of static flows. We showed that there are network topologies
which exhibit Braess’s paradox, but for which the transpose does not. Is this asymmetry of
Braess’s paradox inherent for flows over time? What are the properties of Braess’s paradox
for different models of games with flows over time?
Finally, we conjectured a necessary and sufficient condition of existence of Braess’s paradox
in a network, and proved the condition of existence of the paradox either in the network or
in its transpose. Is this conjecture valid in general?
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